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Peer Group Effects on the Academic Performance  
of Italian Students 
 
Abstract. We analyse peer effects among students of a middle-sized Italian public university. We 
explain students’ average grade in exams passed during their Second Level Degree course on the 
basis of their pre-determined measures of abilities, personal characteristics and peer group 
abilities. Thanks to a rich administrative dataset, we are able to build a variety of definitions of 
peer groups, describing different kinds of students’ interaction, based on classes attended together 
or exams taken in the same session. Self-selection problems are handled through Two-Stage Least 
Squares estimations using as an instrument, the exogenous assigning of students to different 
teaching classes in the compulsory courses attended during their First Level Degree course. We 
find statistically significant positive peer group effects, which are robust to the different definitions 
of peer group and to different measures of abilities. 
 
JEL Classification: I21; Z13; J24. 
 
1. Introduction 
Educational economists have highlighted, in theoretical and empirical studies, the relevance of 
peer group quality to student performance (Epple and Romano, 1998; Hoxby, 2000). A peer 
group affects student achievement in several ways: members of a group interact in learning, 
help each other  in their studies, share important information, impose externalities on others by 
behaving well or badly (for example, a noisy student disrupts the study environment) or by 
allowing teachers to go deeper in subjects, contribute to the formation of values and aspirations, 
and so on.  
Understanding the nature and the magnitude of peer group effects in education is crucial 
for the “productivity” of educational processes and the organizational design of school systems. 
For example, in order to improve student outcomes, it is important to know which inputs 
influence their performance most and the relative importance of peer effects compared to other 
inputs, such as teacher quality or school resources. Peer effects are also  important in school 
design. If peer effects are at work, educational outcomes are affected by how students are 
arranged across classes and the desirability of comprehensive schools (which mix students of 
different abilities together) or stratified schools (which tend to aggregate students according to 
their abilities) depends on the magnitude and non-linearity of peer effects. Further more, the 
selectivity of university admission policies produces different results in the presence of peer 
effects. More importantly, the nature of peer effects also has fundamental implications in a 
family’s choice with regards whether parents consider that their offspring would benefit from 
schools which sort students according to their abilities.  
Starting from the classical study of Coleman et al. (1966), a host of works have 
analysed the effects of peer group on children’s achievement and educational outcomes (Betts 
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and Morell, 1999; Hoxby, 2000; Angrist and Lang, 2004; Hanushek et al., 2003) and on college 
students’ grades and choices of fields of study (Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003; De Giorgi, 
Pellizzari and Redaelli, 2006; Foster, 2006), but several problems and controversies are still  
unresolved. Some of these studies show that peer effects are statistically and economically 
significant in a variety of educational contexts and that students tend to  perform better if the 
quality of their peer group is higher (Ding and Lehrer, 2006; Zimmerman 2003; Vandenberghe, 
2002; Hoxby, 2000; Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmer and Toma, 2000). Moreover, a number of these 
studies show that peer effects are often non-linear, implying that students of middle abilities are 
particularly affected by the negative influence of weak students (Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 
2003). However, the significance and size of peer effects often changes in relation to the sample 
used.  Other studies, in fact, find no significant (or  minor) peer effects (Angrist and Lang, 2004; 
Arcidiacono and Nicholson, 2005; Foster, 2006).  
Earlier analyses of peer effects were based on simple econometric models regressing 
students outcomes on their own individual characteristics (measures of ability, family 
background and so on) and on their peers’ outcomes or characteristics.  
As shown by Manski (1993), this kind of regression is plagued by two main 
econometric problems, which raise doubts  about the causal interpretation of the coefficient 
measuring peer group effects. The first problem, known as “self-selection” bias, depends on the 
fact that groups of peers are often not exogenously determined, but individuals typically choose 
the other people they will associate with . Therefore, the characteristics of each student 
contribute to determining the choice of his/her peers and, if some of these characteristics are not 
observable, an endogeneity problem arises.  
The second econometric  problem, known as the “reflection” problem, emerges because 
the outcomes of students in a peer group evolve in an interdependent manner: the achievements 
of each member affects the achievements of other members but, at the same time, is, itself, 
affected by the achievements of those self-same peers. Therefore, an estimation bias emerges, 
due to simultaneity and inverse causality. 
Recent empirical studies have undertaken a variety of estimation strategies to handle 
these problems. A strategy used by a number of researchers is that of relying on some sort of 
natural experiment which brings about random assignment of peers. Sacerdote (2001), 
Zimmerman (2003) and Foster (2006) analyse peer group effects among undergraduate students 
who are randomly assigned to a college residence. Recently, De Giorgi, Pellizzari and Redaelli 
(2006) have used random assignment to teaching classes as identification strategy to estimate 
peer effects on the choice of the field of study. Other works rely on instrumental variables to 
remove the correlation between unobserved characteristics and peer characteristics trying to find 
exogenous determinants of peer quality (Evans, Oates and Schwab, 1992; Case and Katz, 1991). 
A number of papers try to take into account the endogeneity of the peer group by controlling for 
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school and individual fixed effects (Arcidiacono and Nicholson, 2004; Hanushek et al., 2003). 
Most of the works on peer effects among college students use data from (highly 
selective) US universities, whereas few works have analysed peer effects in European 
universities. Our analysis  is an attempt to reduce this gap by providing evidence of peer effects 
among students of a middle sized Italian university located in the South of the country. 
Importantly, while most of the work on peer effects  in tertiary education considers residential 
peer groups emerging among roommates, we are able to analyze the effects produced on student 
performance by interaction among students who share the same teaching environment and study 
together.  
Thanks to a rich administrative dataset of students enrolled in the Second Level Degree 
(“Laurea Specialistica”)1course in Business Administration at the University of Calabria, we are 
able to build different definitions of the peer groups, mainly based on students attending classes 
together and sitting their exams in the same session. This allows us to investigate peer group 
effects which operate among classmates through mechanisms which rely on the fact that 
classmates contribute to the shaping of their educational environment and that students typically 
interact and establish friendly relationships with students attending lectures in the same classes.  
 Classmates  with high abilities  help create a more effective learning process: instructors 
are not interrupted by students asking silly questions and are able to  use more challenging 
material, in addition they are encouraged in their teaching activity by interested and clever 
students etc. (see Lazear, 2001). We consider this kind of effect through a measure of a peer 
group based on students attending courses together. For each student i we consider, as members 
of his/her peer group, those students who have taken courses together with i. Peer group quality 
is then calculated as the weighted average of abilities of students in the group, using the number 
of courses taken together as weights.  
Apart from peer effects related to the classroom environment, students belonging to the 
same class tend to study and revise the subject together, so generating important externalities. 
Clearly friendly relationships do not  involve all members of a class: some students might attend 
a course together, but their interaction might still be limited. We are able to address this 
problem by considering a measure of peer group which weights peers in relation to the number 
of exams taken together. In fact, students who continually do exams in the same session as one 
another are often students who study together, sharing course material and information. We look 
at all the students passing an exam on the same date and we use this information to define a 
second measure of peer group quality, which weights the abilities of each student according to 
                                                     
1 As explained below, Italian University system is organized in two main levels: students first enrol in 
First Level Degree course and, after graduation, they may choose to enrol in a Second Level Degree 
course. 
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the number of exams taken together with student i.2  
We are aware that these definitions may be affected by self-selection problems since 
students choose other people to collaborate with in studying. In order to overcome possible self-
selection problems, we use a Two-Stage Least Squares estimation and instrument peer groups 
through the random (and compulsory) assignment of students to different teaching classes 
during their First Level Degree course (for a similar strategy, see Foster, 2006). 
Our estimations show that peer group abilities have  considerable, positive effects on 
students’ academic performance. These effects are not brought about by self-selection and are 
robust to a variety of definitions of peer group and several measures of abilities. In our preferred 
Instrumental Variable specification, we find that an increase of one standard deviation in peer 
group quality (measured as the average ability of students attending the same course) produces 
an increase in student performance of 0.19 (the OLS estimates show a smaller effect equal to 
0.13). This is quite a large effect, since the effect produced by an increase of one standard 
deviation in the student’s own ability generates an increase of 0.54. Effects are slightly higher 
when we consider our second measure of peer group quality, based on repeated interaction at 
exams, implying that this measure is able to take into account some relevant interaction taking 
place among students. 
These results suggest that student quality is an important input in tertiary education and 
that, in order to improve their students’ performance, colleges and university should attract high 
quality students. Our results are consistent with selection policies adopted by many US 
universities aimed at admitting only the best students. They also support the idea that students 
applying for highly reputable institutions evaluate not only the high quality of instructors 
provided, but also the high-quality of peers. Moreover, if student performance is determined, at 
least in part, by his/her effort then is rational to subsidize good students for the positive 
externalities they produce. 
This paper is organized in the following way. In section 2, data are presented and some 
descriptive statistics are offered. In section 3, we estimate a simple OLS model. In section 4, we 
instrument our measures of peer group by using the exogenous assignment of students to 
different teaching classes as an instrument. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our analysis is based on administrative data from the University of Calabria, a middle-sized 
public university located in the South of Italy. It has currently about 31,000 students enrolled in 
different degree courses and at different levels of the Italian University system, which, since the 
University Reform of 2001, is organized around two main levels,  comprised of First Level 
                                                     
2 In each academic year Italian students have available several dates to take a given exam (in fact, at 
University of Calabria 7 sessions are available). 
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Degrees (3 years legal duration) and Second Level Degrees (2 years). Students who have 
acquired a First Level Degree can undertake a Second Level Degree.3 In order to gain a Second 
Level Degree students have to pass about 20 exams and to write a dissertation, obtaining a total 
of 120 credits.4 
We focus our analysis on students enrolled, for the academic years 2004-2005 and 
2005-2006, on the Second Level Degree course in “Business Administration” (“Laurea 
Specialistica in Economia Aziendale”). The administrative data we have at hand provide 
detailed information on students’ personal characteristics, secondary school and academic 
results, gender, type of High school attended and final High school grade, province of 
residence5, grades obtained on each course and date of each exam, grades obtained in the First 
Level Degree course, and initial year of enrolment.6 
We started with a sample of 267 students, but we excluded students  who had done 
fewer than 3 exams and, to render students enrolled in different years comparable, we only 
considered exams taken in the first year of their Second Level Degree. Moreover, since, in our 
analysis, we use information about the academic career of students who have  acquired their 
First Level Degree at the University of Calabria, we excluded some observations and our final 
sample was composed of 212 students.  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the sample of students we use. During the first 
year of the Second Level Degree course, our sample of students passed an average of 7.71 
exams  per student. Grades range from 18 to 30 and “30 cum laude”, which we consider equal to 
31. The Average Grade over the exams taken by each student is the measure of academic 
performance which we use as a dependent variable. The mean of Average Grade is 27.05 and its 
standard deviation is 2.06. 
About sixty percent of the students  were female. 76 students (36%) were enrolled  in 
their second year and 136  in their first. Students mainly came from two different types of High 
school: Lyceums (about 34%) and Technical and Vocational Schools (about 66%). Final High 
school Grade (which we denote throughout the paper  as AbilityHS) ranges from 60 to 100, with 
a mean of 89.17. The average grade they obtained at exams during their First Level Degree 
(denoted  as AbilityFirst) is 25.58. The Final First Degree Grade ranges from 86 to 110 and 
“110 cum laude” (which we set as equal to 111)  and has a mean of 102.96.7  
In order to define a single index of individual ability (denoted  as Ability), we undertook 
a principal component analysis summarizing the different measures of ability which we had 
                                                     
3 After Second Level Degree students can enrol in a Ph.D degree. 
4 Each course typically gives 5 credits. 
5 Provinces correspond to the Nuts 3 Eurostat classification. 
6 Data do not provide information on socio-economic and family background. 
7 The Final First Level Degree Grade is calculated on the basis of the average grade obtained at exams. In 
our regressions, we prefer to use AbilityFirst because the Final Grade compresses variability (typically 
each student with an average grade of 27.5 or more obtains the maximum final grade, “110 cum laude”).  
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available (AbilityHS, AbilityFirst, Final First Degree Grade, a dummy for the type of High 
School denoted  as Lyceum)8. Principal component analysis creates linear combinations of the 
original variables which capture the greatest variance. We only use the first principal 
component. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the sample of students enrolled on the Second Level Degree 
course in Business Administration 
Variables Mean Std. Dev Min. Max. Obs.
Average Grade in exams  27.046  2.062 19.667 30.6 212 
Number of exams passed  7.707  2.592 3 13 212 
Female 0.618  0.487 0          1 212
Year of enrolment     0.358  0.481 0   1 212
Final First Level Degree Grade 102.962  6.762 86 111 212 
Average Grade in First Level exams (AbilityFirst) 25.579  1.710 21.682 29.472 212
High School Final Grade (AbilityHS) 89.171  11.387 60 100 212
High School Type: Lyceum         0.340            0.475                 0                  1             212 
Ability     -0.123  1 -2.291  1.915 212
Notes: Grades in each course ranges from 18 to “30 cum laude” (set equal to 31). Final High School Grade ranges 
from 60 to 100. Final First Level Degree Grade ranges from 66 to “110 cum laude” (set equal to 111). 
 
 
3. Econometric Estimations of Peer Group Effects 
We analyse the influence of peer groups on academic performance assuming that a student’s 
academic performance is determined by his/her own characteristics and by the performance and 
characteristics of his/her peers (Sacerdote, 2001). Therefore, we start from the following simple 
model: 
[1]    iijjjii zYXXY εψγφβα +++++=   
where iY  is the performance of student i, iX  is a vector of individual characteristics of i 
(measures of his/her ability and personal characteristics), jX  includes the (predetermined) 
characteristics of j, belonging to the peer group of i (“contextual effects” in the definition of 
Manski, 1993) and jY  are the outcome of i’s peer (Manski’s “endogenous effect”), ijz  are 
common (unobservable) characteristics of the peer group including student i (“correlated 
effects”), iε  is an error term. 
As mentioned previously, this model faces two main econometric problems: 
“reflection” and “selection” bias. With regards the “reflection” problem, that is the fact that the 
achievement of student i, iY , is determined by the  performance of his/her peers, jY , but, 
simultaneously, jY  is determined by iY , we follow the literature (see Sacerdote, 2001; 
Ammermueller and Pischke, 2006), and considering an equation symmetric to [1] for the  
performance of each student j in i’s peer group , by substitution, we obtain the following 
reduced form equation: 
                                                     
8 These variables have been standardized in the principal component analysis. 
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( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )2222 111111 γ εγεψγγγβφγγφβγ γα − ++++−++−++−+= ijijjii zXXY  
or, more simply: 
[2]     εφβα ~~~~ +++= jii XXY  
By estimating equation [2], we are therefore unable to recover the structural parameter 
φ  and γ  and distinguish “endogenous” from “contextual” peer effects, but, in equation [2], we 
obtain the magnitude of “total peer effects” φ~ , which is what matters from a policy point of 
view, although it may be unsatisfactory from a theoretical perspective. 
Another important problem, which may lead to a biased and inconsistent estimate of φ~  
using OLS, is the endogeneity of jX , due to the fact that individuals typically select people 
with whom to associate. This clearly contrasts with an ideal situation in which individuals are 
randomly assigned to different peer groups. If peers are selected according to individual 
characteristics that affect his/her own level of attainment (but are unobservable to the 
researcher), we may end up considering as a peer effect something that, instead, depends on the 
individual’s own attributes which are captured through his/her peer group quality. 
This issue is particularly relevant for our analysis, since our peer group measures are 
based on students taking common courses and exams: students with similar characteristics are 
likely to choose the same courses or to sit a particular exam in the same session. We tackle this 
problem by using, as an instrumental variable for peer group quality, the random assignment of 
students to teaching classes, which, we believe, influences peer group formation, but is not 
correlated to the error term ijz~ , and estimating with the classical Two-Stage Least Squares 
(Evans, Oates and Schwab, 1992). 
We first estimate a single-equation model with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) assuming 
that peer group quality is exogenous. In the next Section, we extend the model to deal with the 
endogeneity problem, treating peer group as a choice variable. 
Our dependent variable iY  is the Average Grade in exams taken by student i during 
his/her first year on the Second Level Degree course. In the vector iX , in turn, different 
measures are considered of i’s own ability: Final High School Grade (AbilityHS), Average 
Grade in the First Level Degree course (AbilityFirst), and a composite index of individual 
ability (Ability)). Other personal characteristics included in vector iX  are: a gender dummy 
(Female), a dummy for the type of High School (Lyceum), and dummies for province of 
residence. 
In order to take into account the levels of difficulty of the different courses chosen by 
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each student (or different evaluation criteria used by different lecturers),9 we control, in each 
regression, for the average of the grades (Average Course Grade) obtained by all other students 
taking a given exam and consider the average over all of the exams taken by student i. Since, as 
we explain below, our sample students have attended part of their First Level Degree courses in 
different teaching classes, we control for some quality characteristics of the  instructors teaching 
in each classes which may affect students’ performance, such as research activity (Instructors’ 
Publications) and teaching experience (Instructors’ Experience). As these regressors vary at 
teaching classes level, in order to avoid biased standard errors, we estimate our models 
clustering the standard errors at this level (Moulton, 1990).  
All variables have been standardized in order to make results comparable in different 
specifications and to render the interpretation of marginal effects more straightforward.  
In Table 2, we report estimates of alternative specifications of our model. In all 
specifications, standard errors (reported in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity. All 
equations include province of residence dummies (not reported so as to save space).  
In column 1, we first estimate an equation without peer effects to check which factors 
determine academic performance. We show that AbilityFirst greatly explains our dependent 
variable, while AbilityHS is not significant.10 Average Course Grade is positive and highly 
significant. The Female and Lyceum dummies are not significant, nor are the dummies for 
province of residence. Variables measuring teaching quality on the  First Level Degree courses 
show a positive and statistically significant effect. 
The other columns in Table 2 include peer group quality among explanatory variables. 
We use different measures of peer group quality. From a theoretical point of view, it is not clear 
whether a student is influenced mainly by his/her close friends, or by his/her classmates, or by 
his/her roommates in college, or by people from his/her place of residence. Our definitions of 
peer group are at an aggregate level and tend to describe different types of interaction among 
students.  
Our first definition of peer group (Peer Course) is based on the group of students who 
have taken a given course, attending classes and taking the exam in the same academic year. 
Therefore, in this case, we are assuming that the relevant peer group is represented by people 
who attend classes together. As shown by Lazear (2001), education in a classroom environment 
is almost a public good. Weak students may impose negative externalities on other students by 
disturbing or slowing-down learning and viceversa.  
Students on the Second Level Degree course in Business and Administration at the 
                                                     
9 Students have a certain freedom to choose courses in their Degree program, after some compulsory 
courses. 
10 This is likely due to the high collinearity between AbilityHS and AbilityFirst (the correlation rate is 
0.56) If we consider AbilityHS as the only measure of ability, it is highly significant with a p-value of 
0.00 (not reported). 
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University of Calabria enrol in a wide range of courses. We do not observe directly the 
composition of students on each course, but we infer this information from exams taken by 
students in a given year. 
For each exam k taken by student i, we first determine the average ability (using 
different measures: AbilityHS, AbilityFirst and Ability) of all other students taking the same 
course. Then, we take the average over all the exams taken by i to calculate the ability of i’s 
peer group:  
∑ ∑
= = ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
i kN
k
J
j
j
ki
i AJN
CoursePeer
1 1
11  
where jA  is the ability of j, Jk is the number of peers in the exam k, Ni are the exams taken by i.  
The average number of exams taken by each students is 7.7111, while the average number of 
students in each course is  24.82.  
Columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 2 use AbilityHS, AbilityFirst and Ability respectively as a 
measure of peer ability jA . In all specifications, controlling for individual characteristics and 
teaching quality, peer effects appear positive and significant. An increase in the (pre-
determined) ability of the peer group of student i (whichever way it is measured) leads to an  
improvement in the academic performance of i. For example, as shown in column 4, an increase 
in the ability of the peer group (measured  as Ability) of one standard deviation leads to an  
improvent in student  performance of about 0.13. The coefficient is significant at 5 percent 
level. 
Smaller effects emerge when we measure peer group ability on the basis of final High 
School grade or of average grade during the First Level degree course (respectively AbilityHS 
and AbilityFirst). As it is possible to see in columns 2 and 3, the coefficient is in, both 
cases,about 0.06, significant respectively at 10 and 5 percent level. 
The other explanatory variables have approximately the same level of significance as in 
column 1. Student’s own abilities, measured by the average grade during the First Level Degree 
course (or by Ability), is, in each specification, positive and highly significant. An increase of 
one standard deviation of an individual’s own ability  improves performance by about 0.55. 
Average Course Grade is always significant, implying that courses chosen by students have 
different degrees of difficulty. Our variables explain more than 50% of total variability. 
In column 5, we investigate the existence of non-linearity in peer effects. Using Ability, 
we have created two dummy variables for whether or not peer group quality was in the top 25 
percent (Peer Course Top), or in the middle 50 percent of the distribution (Peer Course 
Middle). The bottom 25 percent (Peer Course Bottom) represents the omitted category. As 
shown in column 5, students are positively affected by having a peer group of high and medium 
                                                     
11 We excluded students who have passed less than 3 exams. 
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quality (statistically significant respectively at 5 and 1 percent level). The magnitude of 
coefficients is very similar, implying that having a peer group of medium ability instead of  one 
of high ability does not produce any relevant change in student  performance. Results do not 
change when using different measures of ability.  
Following Betts and Morell (1999), in column 6, we also verify whether socio-
economic characteristics of the community where students come from influence their 
performance. We introduce an indicator of educational level, measured as the percentage of 
people living in the area (town or city)  where student i is resident with a college or a high 
school diploma (Population with College or HS), average income (Income), and the 
unemployment rate in the area (Unemployment).12 These socio-economic characteristics do not 
seem to play a relevant role in shaping students’  performance, since their coefficients are all not 
statistically significant. 
 
Table 2. OLS regression estimates for academic achievement.  
Dependent variable: Average Grade in Second Level Degree course exams 
Explanatory Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
AbilityFirst 0.565*** 
[0.062] 
0.545*** 
[0.058] 
0.541*** 
[0.056]   
0.539*** 
[0.069] 
AbilityHS 0.074 
[0.044] 
0.082 
[0.047] 
0.085 
[0.043]   
0.092* 
[0.043] 
Ability 
   
0.554*** 
[0.051] 
0.558*** 
[0.051]  
Female 0.004 
[0.038] 
-0.009 
[0.043] 
-0.015 
[0.044] 
-0.117 
[0.067] 
-0.133 
[0.101] 
-0.009 
[0.051] 
Lyceum -0.003 
[0.106] 
0.004 
[0.103] 
0.006 
[0.102]   
0.001 
[0.111] 
Average Course Grade  0.357*** 
[0.027] 
0.344*** 
[0.029] 
0.353*** 
[0.027] 
0.326*** 
[0.027] 
0.304*** 
[0.048] 
0.339*** 
[0.022] 
Instructors’ Publications 0.326** 
[0.099] 
0.276** 
[0.082] 
0.233** 
[0.083] 
0.234 
[0.119] 
0.344* 
[0.201] 
0.226*  
[0.096] 
Instructors’ Experience 0.375** 
[0.112] 
0.310** 
[0.097] 
0.259* 
[0.102] 
0.236 
[0.139] 
0.363* 
[0.204] 
0.256* 
[0.102] 
Peer Course (AbilityHS) 
 
0.059* 
[0.026]    
0.064* 
[0.026] 
Peer Course (AbilityFirst) 
  
0.065** 
[0.023]    
Peer Course (Ability) 
   
0.131** 
[0.390] 
0.558*** 
[0.051]  
Peer Course Middle 
    
0.347*** 
[0.132]  
Peer Course Top 
    
0.330** 
[0.163]  
Income 
     
-0.028 
[0.048] 
Population with College or HS  
     
-0.001 
[0.060] 
Unemployment rate 
     
-0.079 
[0.042] 
Constant -0.146 
[0.092] 
-0.146 
[0.085] 
-0.138 
[0.091] 
-0.108 
[0.101] 
-0.412** 
[0.185] 
-0.171** 
[0.057] 
Adjusted R2 0.568 0.569 0.569 0.535  0.569 
Observations 212 212 212 212  212 
Notes: In all regression dummies are included for province of residence. Standard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
adjusted for potential clustering at teaching classes level, are reported in brackets. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that 
                                                     
12 We do not consider differences among schools since all students in our sample accomplished their High 
School in public schools which differ from the program of study (Lyceums or Technical and vocational 
schools) but do not differ in terms of resources or teacher/pupil ratio, since the system is highly 
centralized and uniform. 
Page 10 of 20
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 11
coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at 1, 5, and 10 percent level.  
 
 
4. Instrumental Variable Estimations 
In OLS estimates in Table 2, we assumed that peer group quality is an exogenous variable. 
However, individuals typically choose with whom they will associate and so peer quality is, to 
some extent, endogenous. In this case, a regression of student performance on peer abilities 
would be biased and inconsistent because of an endogeneity problem. Therefore we have to deal 
with this problem in order to measure the relevance of peer effects consistently, identifying 
cases where the peers were assigned essentially randomly (see Evans, Oates and Schwab, 1992; 
Foster, 2006). 
We need to find an instrumental variable Z which must comply with the two usual 
conditions:  
1) the instrument must be correlated with the endogenous variable, that is 
( ) 0, ≠ZPeerCourseCov ;  
2) the instrument must not affect student academic performance independently, for 
reasons other than its influence on the formation of peer groups. It is required that the 
instrument is exogenous, that is ( ) 0, =εZCov ;    
We believe that our second definition of peer group (Peer First Degree) has these 
characteristics. Peer First Degree is based on the classes attended by students in the first years 
of their First Level Degree course. Students in our sample were already enrolled at the 
University of Calabria for their First Level Degree. As a result of the high number of students 
enrolled in the First Level Degree course in Business Administration (about 600 students), they 
were assigned to three different teaching classes (Class 1, 2 and 3) for each compulsory course 
in the first two years on the alphabetic basis of the initial letter of their surnames. Students  were 
required to attend lectures in their designated teaching classes and, moreover, it was in the 
student’s interest to respect this  arrangement, because final exams were laid out autonomously 
by the lecturers teaching each class (notwithstanding common programmes). For each year, we 
consider as peers all the students attending the same compulsory course  as part of the same 
assigned classes13 and calculate peer group quality as the average ability of these students (using 
our three measures of ability). 
This definition of peer group, Peer First Degree, is likely to determine the quality of 
peers on the Second Level Degree course since the repeated interactions taking place among 
students in these classes are relevant to the defining of their peer group composition: students 
typically tend to associate, make friends, form stable groups and continue studying  over the 
                                                     
13 The average number of peers according to this definition is 40.83. 
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following years with people who attend the same classes, even during their Second Level 
Degree course.14 Therefore, ( ) 0, ≠egreePeerFirstDPeerCourseCov . Obviously, this aspect can 
be empirically tested and, as we show below, the coefficient of the instrumental variable Peer 
First Degree in the first-stage regressions is always highly significant and the F-test used to 
verify that our instrument is not weak is highly supportive. 
With regards to exogeneity, the Peer First Degree variable is likely to be exogenous 
given the random assigning to classes  according to alphabetical order and the stringent 
requirements for students to attend these classes.  
Moreover, belonging to a given teaching classes should not determine a student’s 
academic performance (except through its influence on the composition of peer groups), since, 
except for instructors’ quality characteristics, for which we control, resources devoted to 
different teaching classes are the same and the same institutional structure was valid over the 
two years.  For these reasons, we are confident that ( ) 0, =εegreePeerFirstDCov  
First of all, in order to check that our instrument is not “weak”, we have tested whether 
the instrument in the first stage regression is significantly different from zero. In the first-stage 
regression in which the endogenous variable, Peer Course, is regressed on the instrument, Peer 
First Class, and all other exogenous variables, the F-statistics, for the test of whether the 
instrument coefficient is equal to zero, are always well above the threshold value of 10 
suggested by Stock and Watson (2003) (F-statistics range from 33 to 140 according to different 
measures of abilities used). 
As a further check that the instrument is not weak, as suggested by Angrist and Krueger 
(1999), in Table 3, we report results from three different estimates of the reduced-form equation 
in which the dependent variable is regressed on all the exogenous variables and on the 
instrumental variable, Peer First Degree: in column 1, we us  AbilityHS as a measure of  peer 
ability, in column 2, we use AbilityFirst and, finally, in column 3, we measure ability  using the 
comprehensive index Ability. Peer First Degree is highly significant in all the specifications, 
implying both that our instrumental variable is a strong determinant of peer group quality and 
that the peer group influences a student’s academic performance. Instructors’ seniority and 
research productivity (measured respectively as the number of years an instructor has worked in 
the university system in a permanent position and as the number of published articles in referred 
journals per year) are not statistically significant. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Reduced form equation estimates  of academic achievement.  
Dependent variable: Average Grade in Second Level Degree course exams 
                                                     
14 On this aspect see also De Giorgi, Pellizzari and Redaelli (2006). 
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Explanatory Variables 1 2 3 
AbilityFirst 0.549*** 
[0.049] 
0.548*** 
[0.054] 
 
AbilityHS 0.079* 
[0.039] 
0.084* 
[0.042] 
 
Ability   0.566*** 
[0.057] 
Female 0.002 
[0.048] 
-0.006 
[0.040 
-0.111 
[0.061] 
Lyceum 0.001 
[0.048] 
0.004 
[0.104] 
 
Average Course Grade 0.360*** 
[0.028] 
0.360*** 
[0.028] 
0.354*** 
[0.028] 
Peer First Degree (AbilityHS) 0.104*** 
[0.026] 
  
Peer First Degree (AbilityFirst)  0.053** 
[0.018] 
 
Peer First Degree (Ability)   0.146*** 
[0.018] 
Instructors’ seniority 0.087 
[0.093] 
0.267** 
[0.077] 
0.034 
[0.045] 
Instructors’ publications 0.072 
[0.087] 
0.229** 
[0.058] 
0.047 
[0.040] 
Constant -0.136 
[0.091] 
-0.138 
[0.093] 
-0.103 
[0.125] 
Adjusted R2 0.572 0.568 0.534 
Observations 212 212 212 
Notes: Dummies are included in all regressions for province of residence. Standard errors, corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and adjusted for potential clustering at teaching class level, are reported in brackets. The 
symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels.  
 
Two-Stage Least Squares 
In this section, we estimate, using Two-Stage Least Squares, the model explaining student’s 
academic performance using the Peer First Degree variable as an instrument for peer group 
quality.  
Before using an instrumental variable estimator, since OLS would be more efficient 
than IV under the hypothesis that OLS are consistent, one should check whether it is necessary 
to use IV at all. In order to verify this aspect, we run the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to verify the 
endogeneity of Peer Course in OLS. We take the residuals from the first stage regression and 
insert them, as explanatory variables, into an “augmented” structural equation. In many of our 
specifications, this variable is significantly different from zero (with the exception of the ability 
measure “Ability First”) showing that OLS is not consistent and suggesting the use of IV to 
address the problem of endogeneity. 
Two-Stage Least Squares Estimations results are shown in Table 4. As above, the three 
columns use AbilityHS, AbilityFirst and Ability respectively as a measure of peer ability. 
Panel B of Table 4 shows the results from First Stage regressions for the different peer 
ability measures. In all the specifications, it emerges that Peer First Degree strongly determines 
the quality of the peer group as measured by Peer Course. Moreover, peer group quality is also 
influenced by a student’s own individual abilities.  
Panel A shows Two Stage Least Squares estimations. Peer Course coefficients are 
always positive and highly significant, regardless of how ability is measured. In column 1, 
controlling for Instructors’ publications and seniority, if peer group quality (measured by 
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AbilityHS) increases  by one standard deviation then a student’s  performance improves  by 
0.24. This coefficient is significant at 10 percent level. In columns 2 and 3, using AbilityFirst 
and Ability respectively, an increase of one standard deviation in peer quality leads to an 
improvement in student performance of 0.09 and 0.19 respectively (significant at 5 and 1 
percent levels).  
 In general, the IV coefficients are higher than the OLS coefficients. This suggests that 
measurement errors in the quality of peer group – which may bias our coefficient of interest 
towards zero – are likely to be more important than the problems of reverse causality.  
 
Table 4. IV regressions of student’s academic performance 
Dependent variable: Average Grade in Second Level Degree course exams 
Explanatory Variables 1 2 3 
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares 
 
AbilityFirst 
  
   0.485*** 
[0.083] 
  0.530*** 
[0.051] 
 
AbilityHS 0.106 
[0.059] 
0.089* 
[0.042] 
 
Ability  
 
   0.541*** 
[0.055] 
Female  -0.051 
[0.034] 
-0.016 
[0.050] 
-0.123 
[0.072] 
Average Course Grade    0.306*** 
[0.033] 
  0.349*** 
[0.031] 
  0.317*** 
[0.029] 
Lyceum 0.022 
[0.102] 
0.004 
[0.103] 
 
Peer Course (AbilityHS)  0.237* 
[0.099]  
 
Peer Course (AbilityFirst)  0.089** 
[0.027] 
 
Peer Course (Ability)  
 
   0.188*** 
[0.027] 
Instructors’ publications 0.124 
[0.135] 
0.222*** 
[0.052] 
0.163** 
[0.060] 
Instructors’ seniority 0.117 
[0.158] 
0.240** 
[0.068] 
0.145* 
[0.067] 
Constant -0.146 
[0.079] 
-0.130 
[0.087] 
-0.099 
[0.101] 
 
Panel B: First Stage Regressions 
 
AbilityFirst 
 
   0.268*** 
[0.700] 
0.202*** 
[0.051] 
 
AbilityHS 
 
-0.112 
[0.075] 
-0.058 
[0.053] 
 
Ability      0.133*** 
[0.047] 
. 
Female  0.224 
[0.123] 
0.116 
[0.086] 
0.062 
[0.096] 
Average Course Grade    0.231*** 
[0.053] 
0.129*** 
[0.037] 
  0.194*** 
[0.043] 
Lyceum -0.303 
[0.318] 
-0.001 
[0.081] 
 
Peer First Degree (AbilityHS)   0.436*** 
[0.075] 
  
Peer First Degree (AbilityFirst)     0.600*** 
[0.046] 
 
Peer First Degree (Ability)      0.775*** 
[0.047] 
Instructors’ publications -0.220 
[0.310] 
0.080 
[0.192] 
-0.616** 
[0.250] 
Instructors’ seniority -0.126 
[0.325] 
0.303 
[0.196] 
-0.591** 
[0.267] 
Adjusted R2 0.367 0.679 0.611 
Observations 212 212 212 
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Notes: Panel A reports the Two-Stage Least Squares estimates, instrumenting Peer Course using Peer First Degree. 
Panel B reports the corresponding first stage. Dummies are included in all regressions for province of residence. 
Standard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity and adjusted for potential clustering at teaching class level, are 
reported in brackets. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at 1, 5, 
and 10 percent levels.  
 
Evaluating Peer effects for individuals who study together 
Students belonging to the same class tend to study and revise the subject together, so generating 
important externalities. However, this kind of relationship does not develop between all the 
members of a class, since, even though attending courses together, some students may not 
interact with each other. In order to overcome this problem and build a peer group measure 
(called Peer Exam) based on this type of interaction, which we believe particularly relevant, we 
consider as members of the same group  students who sit an exam on the same date. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that students  who study together tend to take exams together.  
In each academic year, students in our sample have 7 different dates available to take a 
given exam. For each student, we are able calculate how many times he/she meets any other 
students at exams or, more precisely, how many times they passed an exam on the same date.15 
Students who meet more often at exams are presumably part of the same group. Therefore, we 
calculate the ability of the peer group as a weighted average of “matched” students’ abilities 
(with the three measures: AbilityHS, AbilityFirst and Ability), using the number of matches at 
exams as weights: 
∑
=
=
in
j
jij
i
i AmM
PeerExam
1
1  
where jA  is the ability of student j, ijm  is the number of times student i met student j at exams, 
in  is the number of students met by i, and ∑
=
=
in
j
iji mM
1
 is the total number of matches of i. 
This measure of peer group ability weights the ability of each member of the peer group 
according to the number of exams taken together: students  who are found to have often  sat 
exams together are given a higher weight, while those who match less frequently are weighted 
less.16 A similar strategy to building a peer group is followed by Bayer et al. (2007)17 and De 
Giorgi, Pellizzari and Redaelli (2006). 
Columns 1, 2 and 3 in Table 5 use Peer Exam, calculated using our alternative measures 
of ability, and instrument this variable (which we strongly suspect to be endogenous), again  
using Peer First Degree. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test shows that OLS would not be 
                                                     
15 Unfortunately, we have data on passed exams only, as no information is available regards failed exams. 
16 We also experimented with a measure of peer group which excludes from the peer group all students 
sitting together only once or twice (because this meetings could be due to pure chance). Results are 
similar to those reported. 
17 Bayer et al. (2004) examine peer effects in criminal behaviour and build peer group as a weighted 
average of peer’s characteristic, using as weight the time spent by individuals together in the same prison. 
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consistent (for example, using Ability, the t-statistics of residuals in the augmented structural 
regression is equal to 3.12) and support the use of IV to address the problem of endogeneity. 
Through this new definition of peer group, our previous results with regards the 
relevance of peer effects are confirmed. In fact, the results show that: (a) Peer First Degree 
determines the formation of a peer group (as shown by the high significance of the relative 
coefficient in first stage regressions and by the test for weak instruments for which F-statistics 
takes on values from 26 to 170) and that (b) peer group quality is an important determinant of a 
student’s academic performance (regardless of how abilities are measured). In column 1, we 
show that  if  Peer Exam measured using AbilityHS increases  by one standard deviation, then a 
student’s academic performance  improves  by 0.26 (the coefficient is significant at 5 percent 
level). Analogous results are obtained if we use alternative measures of peer group abilities. For 
example, using Ability, we  find that an increase of one standard deviation in the peer group 
quality leads to an improvement of 0.28 in the student’s academic performance (significant at a 
1 percent level). 
 These coefficients are slightly higher compared to those obtained by considering all 
students attending courses together as peer groups, implying that students’ performance is more 
highly influenced by  colleagues with whom they interact more frequently. 
 
Table 5. IV regressions of student’s academic performance 
Dependent variable: Average Grade in Second Level Degree course exams 
 
Explanatory Variables 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares 
 
AbilityFirst 
  
0.520*** 
[0.062] 
0.534*** 
[0.056] 
 
AbilityHS 
 
0.051 
[0.057] 
0.069 
[0.051] 
 
Ability 
  
0.494***  
[0.075] 
Female  0.003 
[0.049] 
0.002 
[0.044] 
-0.079  
[0.078] 
Average Course Grade 0.310*** 
[0.037] 
0.360*** 
[0.031] 
0.313*** 
[0.036] 
Lyceum 0.021 
[0.101] 
0.004 
[0.111] 
 
Peer Exam (AbilityHS) 0.263** 
[0.098]  
 
Peer Exam (AbilityFirst) 
 
0.097** 
 [0.034] 
 
Peer Exam (Ability) 
  
0.282***  
[0.045] 
Instructors’ publications 0.191 
[0.095] 
 
0.248*** 
[0.048] 
0.192***  
[0.025] 
Instructors’ seniority 
0.185 
[0.113] 
0.271*** 
 [0.067] 
0.165*** 
[0.027] 
 
Panel B: First Stage Regressions 
 
AbilityFirst 0.112   
[0.072]  
0.139***    
[0.068]  
 
AbilityHS 0.106 
[0.076]  
0.153 
[0.071]   
 
Ability   0.256***     
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[0.059]   
Female  -0.002   
[0.125]  
-0.080   
[0.116]  
-0.115 
[0.121]   
Average Course Grade 0.191*** 
[0.054]  
0.002 
[0.050] 
   0.145**    
[0.054]     
Lyceum -0.077    
[0.119]  
0.020 
[0.058] 
 
Peer First Degree (AbilityHS) 0.394***    
[0.077] 
  
Peer First Degree (AbilityFirst)  0.600***    
[0.046]   
 
Peer First Degree (Ability)     0.518*** 
[0.080]   
Instructors’ publications -0.453 
[0.316] 
-0.199 
   [0.259] 
-0.516    
[0.314]   
Instructors’ seniority -0.374   
[0.331]   
-0.038    
[0.264]   
-0.464      
[0.335]   
Adjusted R2 0.268 0.373 0.377 
Observations 212 212 212 
Notes: Panel A reports the Two-Stage Least Squares estimates, instrumenting Peer Course using Peer First Degree. Panel B 
reports the corresponding first stage. Dummies are included in all regressions for province of residence. Standard errors, 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and adjusted for potential clustering at teaching class level, are reported in brackets. The 
symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
A large amount of empirical literature shows that peer group quality has important effects on a 
student’s performance and, more in general, on an individual’s  results. While, for primary and 
secondary education, there is  considerable literature analyzing the effects of classmates’ quality 
on student performance, for tertiary education, research is mainly focused on residential peer 
effects emerging among roommates and little is known about the effects produced on college 
students by different teaching environments. 
Thanks to a rich administrative dataset, we are able to build different definitions of the peer 
group, mainly based on students attending classes together, interacting in study activity and 
sitting their exams in the same session. This allows us to investigate peer group effects  which 
occur among classmates through mechanisms which rely on the fact that classmates contribute 
to the shaping of the educational environment.  
In addition, most research on peer group effects in education  is  focussed  on the US, 
whereas very few  studies examine European schools or universities. To our knowledge, this 
paper is the first attempt to evaluate peer effects in an Italian university.18 Moreover, whereas 
many papers study highly selective universities with rather homogeneous groups (see Sacerdote, 
2001), the students we consider are not sorted through a selection process and are highly 
heterogeneous in terms of abilities. This factor, which widens variability, is likely to increase 
the relevance of peer effects.  
We regress the student’s Average Grade in the Second Level Degree course on his/her 
own predetermined characteristics and abilities and on his/her peers’ abilities. We use a variety 
of definitions of peer group – based on the courses taken together, on classes attended  during 
                                                     
18 De Giorgi, Pellizzari and Redaelli (2006) examine for a prestigious Italian university the influence of 
peer groups on the choice of majors, rather than on academic performance. 
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the First Level Degree course, on the dates of exams– and use different measures of abilities 
(Final High School Grade, Average First Level Degree Grade, type of High School etc.). It is 
likely that the peer group, defined both in terms of classes attended and of exams taken together, 
will encompass the relevant interactions among students. 
In order to overcome the reflection problem, one of the main econometric problems that 
affects estimates of peer effects, we use predetermined variables for abilities, but do not attempt 
to distinguish the channels through which peer group influences a student’s  performance. From 
a policy point of view, this is not particularly detrimental. 
The second econometric problem in estimating peer effects is the endogeneity of the 
peer group, in that individuals tend to choose people with whom to associate. In order to solve 
this issue, we estimate a model with Two-Stage Least Squares, using, as an instrument for peer 
group, the teaching classes to which students were assigned within compulsory courses during 
their First Level Degree. 
Our results show very clearly that peer effects are positive and  substantial. Being part 
of a group with higher abilities considerably improves a student’s academic performance. 
Results are robust to different definitions of a peer group and different measures of ability used. 
Peer group effects emerging from our analysis are, in most of the specifications, larger 
in magnitude than those shown in other studies (Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003). This 
could be due to the fact that our measure of peer group quality includes interactions among 
students – based on attending the same classes, sharing the same educational environment and 
studying together – which are likely to be greater than those deriving from sharing the same  
accommodation . In fact, people sharing the same room may have limited interaction due to the 
fact that they specialise in different areas and have different interests. On the other hand, 
students attending the same courses or working together establish relationships that are crucial 
in determining effective learning processes. 
According to our results, student quality is an important input in tertiary education 
implying that attracting high quality students helps colleges and universities to improve their 
students’ performance. Positive effects produced by high quality peers are consistent both with 
the highly selective policies adopted by many US universities and the high fees that students are 
willing to pay to be admitted  to these universities. 
Peer effects by definition imply positive or negative externalities which lead individual 
choices to be different from optimal social choices. If we realistically assume – following the 
analysis of Costrell (1994) and Kremer, Miguel and Thorntorn (2007) – that student ability is 
not only due to genetic factors, but is also the outcome of student effort during his/her 
educational career, our results suggest that high achieving students should be subsidized 
(through scholarships and grants) for the positive externalities they produce on other students. 
On the other hand, students who perform badly may be encouraged to increase their sub-optimal 
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level of effort by tuition fees which are inversely related to their academic performance 
(Garibaldi et al., 2007). 
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